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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It is to be noted then that excessiveness standing alone will rarely
afford relief. The courts feel justified in interfering in the internal
affairs of corporations only when there is bad faith or lack of authority
for the remuneration. It is submitted that the principle case accords
with this view.
AUGUsT L. MEYLAND, JR.
Declaratory Judgment-Challenging Restrictive and Regulatory
Statutes-Requirement of a Specific Threat of Enforcement
to Justiciability
Certain individual civil service employees and the United Public
Workers of America sought an injunction against members of the Civil
Service Commission to restrain them from enforcing against petitioners
the provisions of the second sentence of §9(a) of the Hatch Act' and
a declaratory judgment that this sentence was unconstittitional. The
sentence reads, "No officer or employee in the executive branch of the
Federal Government ... shall take any active part in political manage-
ment or in political campaigns." Only one of the employees had actually
violated the provisions of the Act challenged. The others filed affidavits
in support of their complaint in which they expressed a desire to engage
in specified political activities which they understood were forbidden by
the challenged sentence. Held, that the latter had not made out a
justiciable case or controversy on which to grant the relief prayed for.2
Only six justices out of seven3 sitting on the case made a direct pro-
nouncement on this particular point, four 4 holding no justiciable case
or controversy, two5 holding that there was." The majority found no
actual interference with petitioners' rights, and only a hypothetical threat
'53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 18 U. S. C. A. §61h(a) (Supp. 1946).
2 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, - U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed.
(Adv. Ops.) 509 (1947).
An adjudication on the merits, declaring the challenged sentence constitutional,
was had in this case, all the justices finding a justiciable case presented by the
employee who had actually violated the challenged sentence. On the merits the
decision was four to three, Justices Rutledge and Douglas dissenting because of
the particular status of the violating employee, that of an industrial worker, and
Justice Black on the grounds that the challenged provision was unconstitutional
on its face.3 Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case. -Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred with the majority
on the merits, but thought that the case should be dismissed as to all the petition-
ers for want of jurisdiction on another procedural basis.
'Justices Reed, Rutledge, Vinson, and Burton.
'Justices Black and Douglas.
'Although injunctive as well as declaratory relief was prayed for, consideration
of justiciability seems to have been confined to the prerequisites for declaratory
relief as presenting the minimum requirements. Therefore this note is also confined
to that area. For an exhaustive analysis of the point under consideration see Bor-
chard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L. J. 445
(1943) ; and Note, 50 YALE L. J. 1278 (1941).
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of such interference, which they thought not sufficient. Mr. Justice
Douglas, in dissent, said, "The threat against them is real not fanciful,
immediate not remote. The case is therefore an actual not a hypothetical
one."7 But Mr. Justice Black found justiciability by reason of the mere
existence of the Act and the petitioners' compliance with it at a sacrifice
by them of asserted civil rights.
Thus it is seen that all but one of the justices deciding this point
demanded at least an actual threat of interference as a condition prece-
dent to justiciability; they differed only in that the majority found at
best a hypothetical threat, while the one dissent thought it real. Only
one seems to have considered seriously the possibility that the mere
existence of the Act could constitute a present deprivation of petitioners'
rights, by reason of their manifest compliance with its prohibitions.8 This
is striking in view of the fact that this argument was directly urged in
the petitioners' brief,9 and was made in the district court's finding of
justiciability cited by Justice Douglas in dissent.:'
The threat which the five justices were searching for was a threat
of enforcement of the sanctions which give the prohibition its teeth, in
this case mandatory dismissal from employment by the Commission.
This approach to the problem seems to put undue emphasis on an ele-
ment of any penal statute which is merely incidental to its main purpose
of prohibiting or regulating a certain area of activity. It assumes the
unrealistic attitude that a person whose activities are within the pur-
view of the statute can only be affected thereby when its sanctions are
enforced against him. Professor Borchard has succinctly stated the
pre-enforcement effect of such a statute:
"As a rule, the mere enactment of a statute or ordinance im-
posing restraints on an individual and implying enforcement by
prosecuting officials threatens and hampers the plaintiff's freedom,
peace of mind or pecuniary interests, and creates that justiciability
" United Public Workers v. Mitchell, cited supra note 2, at 579, 91 L. Ed. at
533.
' The majority opinion may be construed as having considered the point, re-jecting it because of uncertainty as to the exact activities being prohibited. But in
view of the obvious restraints imposed by the verbiage of the sentence, supple-
mented by direct commission prohibitions against specified activities cited by Jus-
tice Black in dissent, United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 7, at 573,
91 L. Ed. at 527, its consideration can only be deemed cursory. The case cited by
the majority in this connection, Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory,
325 U.. S. 450 (1944), is distinguishable. There the key prohibitory word in a
challenged state statute was "functioning," and the Court quite obviously thought
it too vague and uncertain in view of, its lack of construction by the state court
or application by enforcing officers to make possible more than speculation as to
the exact activities being prohibited by its existence.
"Even when not inflicted in specific cases, the statutory prohibition and pen-
alty have the present effect of deterring lawful conduct, and thus inflict the injury
of deprivation of constitutional rights." Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 5, United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 8.
"0 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 577, 91 L. Ed. at 531, 532.
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of the issue which sustains a proceeding for an injunction, and,
a fortiori, for a declaratory judgment." '1
Can explanation be found for the Supreme Court's refusal to con-
sider this pre-enforcement effect of the statute as creating justiciability?
The inquiry becomes more pertinent in view of the fact that the Court
has in the past found justiciability on just such a basis. 12 In these cases,
the sole prayer for relief was injunction, and in granting such relief in
the Terrace, Pierce, and Euclid cases it has been urged that the Supreme
Court permitted an abuse of the injunctive process in that in its zeal to
relieve from the pre-enforcement burden it did not require any showing
of irreparable injury or inadequacy or legal remedy.13 Now, confronted
with the same type situation and armed with a new procedure, the
statutory declaratory action, which does not require irreparable injury or
inadequacy of legal remedy as a prerequisite of equitable jurisdiction,
the court fails to find justiciability.
Two explanations may be suggested. The early misgivings with
which the Court regarded the declaratory judgment procedure 4 may not
have been entirely dissipated by its final acceptance of the procedure in
state' 5 and federal 16 courts, so that they still influence to a great extent
its test of justiciability. In no use of the procedure have these misgiv-
1 BORCHARW, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 966 (2d ed. 1941).
Columbia System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 418 (1942) (in granting
an injunction against the enforcement of an FCC order requiring the refusal of
license to any broadcasting station which entered into certain prohibited contracts
with networks, petitioner not yet having been refused such license, the Court said,
"Most rules of conduct having the force of law are not self-executing, but require
judicial or administrative action to impose their sanctions with respect to par-
ticular individuals .. . a valid exercise of the rule-making power is addressed to
and sets a standard for all to whom its terms apply. It operates as such in advance
of the imposition of sanctions upon any particular individual. It is common ex-
perience that men conform their conduct to regulations by governmental authority
so as to avoid the unpleasant legal consequences which failure to conform en-
tails. . . . It is alleged without contradiction that numerous affiliated stations
have conformed to the regulations to avoid loss of their licenses with consequent
injury to appellant. Such regulations have the force of law before their sanctions
are invoked as well as after. When, as here, . . . the expected conformity to
them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity, they are appropriately the sub-
ject of attack....") ; City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926)
(injunction restraining enforcement of zoning ordinance before petitioner had even
applied for building permit) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1924)
(injunction restraining, enforcement of state statute two years before its effective
date; present deprivation of property rights) ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197
(1923) (Washington statute forbade land ownership by certain alieis; injunction
issued restraining enforcement thereof against petitioner who alleged merely that
he wished to sell land to such an alien, on grounds unconstitutional).
"s See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 434, 435; but cf. Note, 3 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 248 (1934).1 Piedmont and Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469 (1930) ; Lib-
erty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers, 276 U. S. 71 (1928); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927).
" Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286 (1934); Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933).
" Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937).
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ings been more apparent than where declarations on constitutional issues
were sought. The reasons for this wariness with respect to constitu-
tional issues have not been expressly announced by the Court, but others
have attempted explanation,' 7 and some have praised the Court's atti-
tude to the extent of advocating exception of these cases from the pur-
view of the Federal Act.' s The general tenor of these discussions is
that an all-out use of the declaratory procedure in constitutional cases
will cloak the Supreme Court with practical veto power over state and
federal legislation, at a sacrifice of the traditional function of the judi-
ciary. But, admitting to some extent the .validity of this argument,
although it has been met on its own grbund with much force by the
greatest authority on this procedure, 19 it is submitted that in the par-
ticular field under consideration, some retreat from the traditional
judicial function is warranted. If it be admitted that such statutes as
the one under consideration may operate from their inceptions as uncon-
stitutional deprivations of rights, should there not be a remedy, and that
as speedily as possible? The declaratory judgment procedure seems to
be hand-made for the purpose; Congress evidently contemplated its pre-
enforcement use in enacting the Federal Act.20 If it cannot be availed
of by an aggrieved party in such cases, it appears that here is a wrong
without a remedy except when the aggrieved party has submitted him-
self by violation to further injury. This should not be a condition prece-
dent to obtaining relief.2 '
The Court's requirement of a threat of enforcement may be ex-
plained, aside from the general policy grounds set out above, on a pro-
cedural basis. The immunity of both the individual states2 and the
United States23 to actions testing the constitutionality of their legislative
enactments results in the necessity of bringing such actions against the
proper enforcing officer as distinguished from the sovereign. This
focuses attention at the outset on enforcement by the officer rather than
17 See TBURMAN ARNOLD, SYMDOLS OF GOVERNMENT 186 (1935).
18Notes, 51 HARv. L. IEv. 1267 (1938) ; 45 HAav. L. RE. 1089 (1932).19Borchard, Declaratory Judgmenas in Federal Courts, 41' YALE L. J. 1195(1932) ; BORCHARD, op. cit. supra notes 11, 13, at 766-770.20 See SEN. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3 (1934).1 See Mr. Justice Butler, in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 216, 'They
are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines and imprisonment and loss of
property in order to secure an adjudication of their rights!'2 The doctrine of state immunity to such actions, its inception and effect are
discussed in Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1 (1925). The
fiction that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute is
actually a personalized action against the attorney-general, divested of official capac-
ity, had its inception in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1907).
'The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act did not enlarge the area of the
susceptibility of the United States to suit beyond that set out by the Tucker Act
and other statutory provisions. Of course if a declaratory judgment action to
determine the constitutionality of an Act of Congress can be brought within the
area delimited by those special statutory provisions the United States may be
made a party defendant.
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the sovereign's enactment as the wrong complained of, so that require-
ment of threat of enforcement naturally follows. This procedural re-
quirement should not be allowed to be-cloud the obvious adverse interest
which the sovereign has in such actions. The doctrine of state immunity
to such actions as derived from the Eleventh Amendment has been
criticized as conflicting with the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
to afford protection against state enactments.24  The Judiciary Act of
193725 provides for intervention by the United States in cases, including
declaratory judgment actions, where the constitutionality of an act of
Congress is involved. This seems to be a tacit Congressional recognition
that in such proceedings the United States has a definite adversary in-
terest, although the action cannot be brought against the United States
in the first instance. The effect of the sovereign immunity doctrine on
the type of cases under consideration is made apparent by the fact that
pre-enforcement declaratory judgment actions challenging municipal
ordinances, where the municipality itself can be made the party defend-
ant, have probably had the most success in this field, insofar as hav-
ing the Court recognize justiciability of the issue is concerned. 2  How-
ever, these cases might be explained also by the fact that state courts
generally have been less prone to require a showing of threatened
enforcement. So that even where a state statute is challenged and the
enforcing officer is made the party defendant, state courts have usually
found pre-enforcement justiciability.=2 If this procedural requirement
" Note, 50 HAiRv. L. REv. 956 (1937).
" 50 STAT. 751 (1937), 28 U. S. C. A. §401 (Supp. 1946).
" Lisenba v. Griffin, 242 Ala. 661, 8 So. 2d 175 (1942) (regulating operation
of barber shops; in this case the City Barber Board made party defendant rather
than the municipality); Dowdy v. City of Covington, 237 Ky. 274, 35 S. W. 2d
304 (1931) (regulation of moving van business); Barron v. Minneapolis, 212
Minn. 566, 4 N. W. 2d 622 (1942) (regulating owning and operation of coin-
vending machines used for sale of edibles); Quaker Oats Co. v. City of New
York, 295 N. Y. 527, 68 N. E. 2d 593 (1946) (regulating sale of horse meat
for animal feed) ; 432 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 184 Misc. 1001, 55
N. Y. S. 2d 203 (1945) (zoning ordinance; but court stressed fact that here
petitioner could be considered as stating a grievance on behalf of a large group
and that more was involved than merely the unique problem of a particular land-
owner); Drake v. City of Portland, 172 Ore. 558, 143 P. 2d 213 (1943) (civil
service commission order reclassifying employees); Vermont Salvage Corp. v.
Village of St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A. 2d 188 (1943) (regulating junk
dealers). But cf. Witschner v. City of Atchison, 154 Kan. 212, 117 P. 2d 570
(1941) (declaratory judgment that certain type pin-ball machines was not within
purview of anti-gambling statute refused; distinction should be made between 1ala
in se criminal statutes and those merely inala prohibitum).
27 American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P. 2d 145
(1944) (regulating labor unions); Doyle v. Clark, 220 Ind. 271, 41 N. E. 2d
949 (1942) (regulating sale of alcoholic beverages in certain stores under certain
conditions); Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A. 2d 880 (1944) (regulating
advertising by physicians and surgeons; granted despite procedural error of join-
ing state as party defendant); Chronicle & Gazette Publishing Co. v. Att'y Gen'l,
- N. H. - , 48 A. 2d 478 (1946) (regulating political advertisement rates) ;
statute violated, but apparently no threat of enforcement); Arnold v. Board of
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is indeed a factor in the test of pre-enforcement justiciability the United
States Supreme Court seems peculiarly influenced by it.
With increasing state and federal legislation regulating business
activities and civil rights,28 it is safe to assume that persons such as
petitioners in the instant case will continue to resort to the declaratory
judgment procedure as a possible mode of obtaining surcease from the
restraints of such legislation before actually violating its provisions. The
fact that their chances of even getting such complaints considered on
their merits will probably vary with the place of the enacting legislature
and of the court in the governmental hierarchy is an anomaly. The
anomaly is the more serious because the higher the prestige, and prob-
ably the effect, of such legislation, the less opportunity there will be for
obtaining pre-enforcement relief.
A repudiation of the doctrine of Ex parte Young9 to lift state im-
munity from such actions, and legislation making the United States
suable in such actions might help to de-emphasize the threat of enforce-
ment as a factor and lead to its repudiation by the highest Court for
reasons already suggested. However, if this procedural aspect be not the
crux of the problem, but merely a handy device to buttress the Supreme
Court's desire not to handle such cases before actual violation as a matter
of policy,30 then the anomoly will probably remain until the court recon-
siders this policy in the light of the quandary in which it places the
affected individuals, and therein finds it wanting. Perhaps the dissent
in the instant case, particularly that of Mr. Justice Black, presages such
a reconsideration.
J. DicxsoN PHILLIPS, JR.
Evidence-Employer's Vicarious Liability for Negligent Operation
of Automotive Vehicle-Presumptions from Ownership
In Carter v. Thurston Motor Lines,1 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held in a four to three decision that the plaintiff failed to make
Barber Examiners, 45 N. M. 57, 109 P. 2d 779 (1941) (regulating prices in
barber shops). Contra: De Cano v. State, 7 Wash. 2d 613, 110 P. 2d 627 (1941).
For earlier cases to the same effect as these and those in note 26, supra, see
BORcHARD, op. cit. supra, at 969-971, and cases there collected.
" Prqbably most striking recent examples are those federal and state measures
designed to curb subversive activities, particularly among federal and state em-
ployees. The president's executive order "prescribing procedure for the adminis-
tration of an employee's loyalty program in the executive branch of the govern-
ment," Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947), has already been ques-
tioned by eminent jurists as respects its procedural sufficiency. Chafee, Griswold,
Katz, and Scott, The Loyalty Order, N. Y. Times, April 13, 1947, §4, p. 8E, col. 4.
A recent example of state legislation on the same subject is North Carolina's
amendment to N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-12 (1943) by (1947) session of N. C. Gen-
eral Assembly, S. B. No. 1028; H. B. No. 980.
"' See notes 22 and 24 supra. "8 See notes 17 and 18 supra.
L227 N. C. 193, 41 S. E. 2d 586 (1947).
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